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NEW CONTROLS ON GLOBAL DEBT: THE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION
ACT OF 1983
During the 1970s, commercial bank lending to developing coun-
tries grew at unprecedented rates, replacing other forms of investment
as the main source of financing for their expanding economies.1 Exter-
nal credit flows allowed developing countries to maintain high growth
rates despite rising oil prices and balance-of-payments deficits, 2 but the
growing debt gave rise to increased risk of future financial strains. In
the early 1980s, global recession, rising interest rates, and a severe
drop in commodity prices3 precipitated a series of debt-servicing
problems, which quickly evolved into a worldwide financial crisis.4 By
the end of 1982, the growth of international debt had reached such
proportions that the disruption of debt service5 threatened the stability
of the international financial system as well as the prospects for a
global economic recovery.
6
The buildup of international debt forced a reappraisal of commer-
cial bank lending and of banking regulation. Regulatory supervision
and controls had proved inadequate to prevent dangerous overlending
by U.S. banks to developing countries.7 When Congress responded to
the debt crisis with legislation in 1983, it sought not only to address
the immediate liquidity problems of the distressed debtor countries but
also to adopt long-range structural reforms for the international finan-
The author wishes to thank Walker F. Todd, member, New York Bar, for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this Note. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the
author.
1. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 25 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]. The term "developing coun-
tries" includes all countries except those classified as "industrial" or "oil exporting" coun-
tries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The oil exporting countries are
essentially the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
See id. at 168.
2. Id. at 5.
3. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1983, at 8-12.
4. W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECON-
OMY 9-10 (1983).
5. "Debt service" is the payment of interest on short- and long-term debt plus install-
ments of principal legally due on long-term debt. T. WALMSLEY, A DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 67 (1979). The shortfall in debt service payments is known as
"arrears" or "arrearages."
6. See infra text accompanying note 15.
7. S. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1983). See also infra notes 25-38 and
accompanying text.
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cial system. The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983,8
passed as part of the debt crisis package, 9 imposes new controls on
foreign lending that are aimed at preventing a recurrence of the debt
buildup.10
Section I of this Note examines the origins of the debt crisis and
the need for improved controls on international lending. Section II
discusses recent legislation intended to meet the crisis, the Interna-
tional Lending Supervision Act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. Section III analyzes the effect that the Act will have on




Following the sharp rise in world oil prices in 1973-74,11 the
external debt of the non-oil-exporting developing countries grew to
unprecedented levels as these countries struggled to finance a growing
balance-of-payments deficit. 12 At the same time, commercial banks,
encouraged by high developing country growth rates in the 1960s and
1970s and pressed to invest oil exporting countries' surplus deposits,
increased their lending to developing countries. From the mid-1970s
to the early 1980s, commercial bank lending to developing countries
grew at an annual rate of about twenty percent, comprising an ever-
increasing proportion of developing-country financing.1 3
A. THE DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980s
The second large oil price increase, which occurred in the late
1970s, was followed by a global recession in the 1980s, a dramatic fall
8. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IX, 97 Stat.
1278 (1983) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912) [hereinafter cited as ILSA].
9. Congress voted to increase the resources available to the IMF, as well as to
reauthorize funds for the Export-Import Bank and other international development banks.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
10. ILSA, § 902(a).
11. S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 3; see IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra
note 1, at 46.
12. The external debt of the non-oil developing countries grew almost fivefold from
1973 to 1982 when it reached approximately $612 billion. IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUT-
LOOK, supra note 1, at 200, table 32. The current payments deficit in the non-oil developing
countries rose to $69 billion by 1981, from an estimated level of $2 billion in 1973. BANK
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS [BIS], ANNUAL REPORT, 1982, at 93; BIS, ANNUAL
REPORT, 1976, at 61.
13. By mid-1982, bank loans to developing countries reached $344 billion. R. DALE &
R. MATTIONE, MANAGING GLOBAL DEBT 9 (1983). In 1971, bank loans accounted for
only 13% of total medium- and long-term debt outstanding. By 1982, they provided 35%,
the single largest source of medium- and long-term funds. Id. at 8.
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in commodity prices, and accelerating interest rates.14 The resulting
shortage of foreign exchange, exacerbated by a sudden contraction in
credit flows to developing countries, brought about severe debt service
problems, which threatened the stability of the international financial
system. In late 1982 and 1983, approximately two-thirds of all bank
debt owed by developing and Eastern European countries suffered a
disruption of debt service or formal rescheduling.1 5 Strong action by
the borrowing countries,1 6 supported by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the international banking community, and the govern-
ments and central banks of many of the industrialized countries, kept
the immediate liquidity crisis from escalating into massive default.17
The implications of this disruption in debt service for U.S. banks
were severe. U.S. banks held approkimately one-third of outstanding
loans to developing countries.1 8 Moreover, the loans were highly con-
centrated, both by borrowing country and among lending banks. The
nine largest U.S. banks had extended over sixty percent of these loans,
which amounted to over twice their capital by mid-1982. The next
fifteen largest U.S. banks accounted for an additional twenty percent.
About half of the loans were to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.1 9
14. See generally IMF, RECENT MULTILATERAL DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS WITH
OFFICIAL AND BANK CREDITORS, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 25 (1983) (origins of the cri-
sis); W. CLINE, supra note 4. In 1980, commodity prices fell 30%, to their lowest levels in
years, while the volume of world trade declined for only the second time in the postwar era.
S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 4. For a discussion of commodity price developments, see
IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at 154-59.
15. W. CLINE, supra note 4, at 10.
16. The major distressed debtor countries adopted stringent economic adjustment
measures at the behest of the IMF and the lending banks. On the austerity measures of
Mexico and Brazil, see M. MENDELSOHN, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE RESTRUCTUR-
ING OF CROSS-BORDER DEBT (1983).
17. On the financial rescue packages put together in 1982-83, see IMF, RECENT MUL-
TILATERAL DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS, supra note 14; W. CLINE, supra note 4, at 40-44.
The packages included economic adjustment measures, an IMF program, additional bank
lending, and official bridging loans (short-term loans that enable a borrower to service
existing loans until a debt rescheduling can be arranged). Id. at 40.
18. In mid-1982, U.S. banks had extended $99 billion in loans to developing countries,
excluding OPEC and Eastern European borrowers. International Financial Markets and
Related Problems: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 71, table II (1983) [hereinafter cited as International Financial
Markets and Related Problems] (statement of Paul A. Volcker, chmn., Bd. of Gov., Fed.
Res. Sys.).
19. Id. at tables II-IV.
Compounding this concentration was the fact that most of the increase over this
period was in the form of short-term credits. While they seemed less risky than
medium- and long-term credits and while they were attractive to the LDC's [less-
developed countries] in times of high interest rates, they also increased the borrow-
ers' vulnerability to a sudden reduction in the willingness of lenders to roll over
existing debt. Moreover, short-term lending provided little protection for the
banks as a group, since they could not all attempt to withdraw such credit at the
same time without provoking a liquidity crisis for the borrowers.
S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 4-5.
428 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
A number of factors contributed to the high lending concentra-
tions of the large international banks. Economic motives were the
most prominent factor. Banks simply responded to lending opportuni-
ties and to the advantages of developing a relationship with a particu-
lar country.20 Other contributing factors included inadequate
information on borrowing countries' total indebtedness, internal pres-
sures generated by bank lending officer performance evaluations, and
competition among lenders for continued relationships with borrow-
ers. 21 The overexposure resulting from these and other factors lead
one study to conclude: "The lesson to be learned from recent events
.. .is that the market cannot be. . .relied on. . .to impose a pru-
dent ceiling on the indebtedness of individual countries.
'22
The high lending concentrations in individual countries placed
the largest U.S. banks in a potentially vulnerable position. High con-
centrations not only expose banks to the risk of a larger default but
also may put excessive bargaining power into the hands of borrow-
ers.23 Holders of large claims generally will agree readily to
reschedule or modify terms of repayment. Lenders are also more will-
ing to extend new credit to protect outstanding loans. Moreover, if the
amount of new credit needed to protect the outstanding loans becomes
greater than the bank's unimpaired capital, affecting the bank's insur-
ers' and possibly its creditors' interests, the borrowers gain even more
bargaining power.24
B. THE INADEQUACY OF PRIOR INTERNATIONAL LENDING
SUPERVISION
Banking industry observers first expressed concern about the sta-
bility of the banking system in the mid-1970s, as they witnessed a ris-
ing number of bank failures.25 They also voiced warnings about the
sudden increases in international debt and the development of danger-
20. For an analysis of these and other factors contributing to the banks' heavy concen-
trations of country exposure, see To Increase the U.S. Quota in the International Monetary
Fund and Related Matters: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Invest-
ment, and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 186-92 (1983) [hereinafter cited as To Increase the U.S. Quota] (paper
by Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring).
21. Id
22. R. DALE & R. MArTIONE, supra note 13, at 24-25.
23. This reflects the adage that "a large enough debt turns a creditor into a partner."
Huff, The Rescheduling of Country Debt: Is a More Formalized Process Necessary?,
reprinted in GROUP OF THIRTY, RISKS IN INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING 52 (1982).
24. For an analysis of the danger of high country concentration exposure, see Gutten-
tag & Herring, Uncertainty and Insolvency Exposure by International Banks, 4 BROOKINGS
DIScussION PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1983); GROUP OF THIRTY, RISKS
OF INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING, supra note 23.
25. H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1983).
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ous ratios of deposits and credits to capital.2 6 In 1977, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report that revealed inconsistencies
among and within the federal banking agencies27 regarding the super-
vision of foreign lending. The report also identified inadequate con-
trols on foreign lending within banks.28
The federal banking agencies subsequently took steps to improve
supervision of foreign lending. In late 1977, they instituted the Coun-
try Lending Exposure Survey, a semi-annual report designed to collect
information on loans to foreign borrowers.29 The Interagency Coun-
try Exposure Review Committee (ICERC), established in 1979,
devised a uniform system for evaluating the unique risks in interna-
tional banking, which were not accounted for under previous bank
examination procedures.30 In particular, the ICERC was to review
"transfer risk"31 and to categorize the credit standing of individual
country borrowers. Examiners were to consider these credit classifica-
tions when determining prudent country exposure levels for individual
banks and when formulating comments and recommendations for
their examination reports.
32
The ICERC evaluations were purely advisory, however, and they
ultimately proved ineffective in light of the debt service crisis of
26. Id. at 32; Burns Warns Banks on LDC Lending Pace, The Am. Banker, March 11,
1977, at 1, col. 5. Bank failures and near-failures in Germany and England indicated that
European supervisory controls might also be inadequate to cope with new patterns of inter-
national finance. Id. See also Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62
A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976) (collapse of the German international bank in 1974).
27. The federal banking agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). State banking departments also supervise banks chartered
within their borders. No single banking regulatory agency has the authority or responsibil-
ity to oversee international lending.
28. GAO, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS (1977).
29. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council publishes the Country
Exposure Report (Form FFIEC 009) in aggregate form. The report includes data on cross-
border loans not repayable in local currency and not subject to third country guaranties.
See International Financial Markets and Related Problems, supra note 18, at 385-86 (1983)
(statement of Richard Dale, guest scholar, The Brookings Inst.); A New Supervisory
Approach to Foreign Lending, FED. RFs. BANK N.Y.Q. REV., Spring 1978, at 1.
30. For a description of the country risk evaluation program instituted by the ICERC,
see International Financial Markets and Related Problems, supra note 18, at app. II, 84-89
(statement of Paul A. Volcker).
31. Transfer risk is the possibility that a borrower will not be able to maintain debt
servicing in the currency in which the debt is to be repaid because of a lack of foreign
exchange in the borrower's country, irrespective of the borrower's own financial position.
See id. Such a risk is unique to international lending. Cf Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve
Regulations 49 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5592 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 20, 211, 351)
[hereinafter cited as ATRR Regulations] (definition of transfer risk).
32. See International Financial Markets and Related Problems, supra note 18, at app.
II, 84-89 (statement of Paul A. Volcker).
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1982.33 Loan concentrations had continued to grow, especially in
lending to Latin America.34 Banks had also failed to increase suffi-
ciently provisioning for loans to countries in difficulty.35 While the
large U.S. banks began to increase their loan loss reserves in 1982,
increases and total reserves lagged well behind those of banks in other
major lending countries.
36
Both legislators and banking regulators recognized that current
measures were inadequate to reduce overextension in foreign lending.
Legislators pointed to a failure of regulatory and supervisory controls
to monitor international lending and to prevent unsound concentra-
tions of country exposure. Moreover, they cited lack of enforcement
by regulatory agencies, which had robbed existing requirements of any
strength.37 In congressional testimony, FDIC Chairman William M.
Isaac stated, "[A]s bank supervisors, we failed to effectively caution
American banks to restrain foreign lending growth. Although portfo-
lio concentrations were identified and commented upon, sufficiently
firm steps were not taken to limit concentrations and the leveraging of
bank capital. Without question our supervisory efforts need
buttressing.
'38
33. A follow-up report issued by the GAO in 1982 found that "comments by bank
examiners have had little impact in restraining the growth of. . . [bank] exposures."
GAO, BANK EXAMINATION FOR COUNTRY RISK AND INTERNATIONAL LENDING iv
(1982). The report identified a number of other weaknesses in the system, including a lack
of consistency in highlighting the special comments; identification of too many "problem
countries," thereby diminishing the impact of comments; and inadequate analysis in the
risk-evaluation stage of the system. Id. Richard Dale notes, for example, that for the pur-
pose of evaluating country lending exposures, capital funds are defined to include
subordinated debt and loan loss reserves, producing lower country exposure figures than
those derived based on published equity capital. International Financial Markets and
Related Problems, supra note 18, at 387 n.4.
34. By mid-1982, loans to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, made by the nine largest
U.S. banks, reached almost 140% of their combined equity capital. H.R. REP. No. 175,
supra note 25, at 36. Loans to all non-OPEC developing countries reached 270% of the
nine banks' combined capital. Id See generally International Financial Markets and
Related Problems, supra note 18, at 386-91 (statement of Richard Dale).
35. In 1982, the nine largest U.S. banks had reserves amounting to 1.7% of the value of
their total loans outstanding to eleven countries that had recently experienced a disruption
in debt service. W. CLINE, supra note 4, at 98.
36. In the second half of 1982, the largest U.S. banks increased loan loss reserves by
55% or less over 1981, while comparable British banks increased reserves by 200%. See To
Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 494 (statement of Karin Lissakers, resident
assoc., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, former Deputy Dir. for Policy Planning,
Dep't of State).
37. H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 25, at 30-37.
38. International Bank Lending: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1983) [hereinafter cited as International Bank
Lending] (statement of Hon. William M. Isaac, chmn., FDIC and Fed. Fin. Inst. Examin.




Congress initially responded to the debt crisis with two related
measures. With Administration support, some legislators sought to
authorize an $8.4 billion increase in U.S. participation in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund in order to fulfill a general quota increase voted
by Fund members in 1982. 39 The IMF bill came under sharp attack in
Congress as a "big bank bailout."'4 Critics contended that IMF loans
to distressed countries merely go to pay interest on debts to large com-
mercial banks.41 Supporters of the increase sought to mollify the
opposition by tying it to legislation requiring tougher supervision and
restrictions on foreign lending by U.S. banks.42
A. MOTIVES FOR REFORM
The congressional banking committees convened hearings in late
1982 and early 1983 on the role of U.S. banks in the international debt
crisis. 43 Various groups exhibited divergent goals by offering their
views of and remedies for the problem. Some legislators saw tougher
restrictions on banks as a quid pro quo for what they or their constitu-
ents perceived as a bonus for big banks. 4 Others agreed to support
restrictions in order to obtain passage of the IMF increase.45 Still
others cautioned against seeking retribution from U.S. banks and
against overreacting to the problem.
46
While banking regulators agreed that more effective controls were
advisable, they emphasized the need for flexibility in applying new
safeguards in order not to jeopardize short-term commercial credit
flows to borrowers in difficulty. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul A. Volcker warned that the sudden imposition of stiff regulatory
measures might induce "abrupt action by lenders to withdraw from
39. 1983 CONG. Q. 2488 (Nov. 26). The increase represented a 50% increase in mem-
bers' quotas; at current rates of drawings, however, further increases will be necessary in
late 1984 or early 1985. See To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 488-89 (state-
ment of Karin Lissakers).
40. H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 25, at 25-26.
41. Id.
42. See 41 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 144-45 (Aug. 1, 1983); To Increase the
U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 488-89 (statement of Karin Lissakers).
43. S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 10-11; H.R. REP. No. 175, supra note 25, at 38.
44. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems] (remarks of Sen. Heinz) ("The
price of [an] $8.4 billion increase in the Congress is going to be [international banking
supervision] legislation.").
45. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 95 (state-
ment of Sen. Garn, chmn.).
46. Senator Garn cautioned legislators to bear in mind the problems that could result
from over-regulation. Id. at 2.
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lending .. .which would precipitate financial crises in otherwise
creditworthy countries." 47 Regulators insisted that reforms could be
introduced without new enabling legislation, but members of Congress
doubted the effectiveness of purely regulatory measures. 48 Some
industry observers also questioned the ability and willingness of regu-
lators to take a tougher stand without legislative backing.
49
Responding to congressional pressure, the federal banking agen-
cies presented a joint memorandum to Congress proposing reforms of
the supervision and regulation of international lending.50 The propo-
sal, which became the cornerstone of draft legislation,51 consisted of
measures to:
(1) strengthen existing procedures for country risk examination and
evaluation;
(2) increase collection and public disclosure of data on banks' country
exposures;
(3) establish a system of special reserves for problem foreign loans;
47. Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 9; Interna-
tional Financial Markets and Related Problems, supra note 18, at 214 (testimony of William
S. Ogden, vice chmn., Chase Manhattan Bank) ("[T]he extent to which the international
banking system can contribute to the future resolution of the debt problem is directly
related to the extent of the penalty now being paid by the banks for their past decisions
... . To add to [the penalty] through new administrative measures would diminish the
capability of banks to furnish needed credits. .. ").
Yet another interested party, the Securities and Exchange Commission, concerned pri-
marily with protection of investors, focused on reforms to reflect more clearly the effect of
international lending on the financial position of bank holding companies. See Interna-
tional Bank Lending, supra note 38, at 350 (statement of John S.R. Shad, chmn., SEC). In
1982, the SEC instituted additional foreign loan disclosure requirements for bank holding
companies in SEC filings. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. The tension between
the SEC and the banking regulatory agencies over the type and amount of information
banks should be required to disclose is a result of the different missions of the agencies-
protection of investors versus protection of the soundness and stability of the banking sys-
tem. See Guttentag & Herring, Disclosure Policy and International Bank Lending, 7
BROOKINGS DISCUSSION PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 3-4 (1983).
48. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 7 (state-
ment of Sen. Proxmire).
49. "[R]egulatory compromises which have been made to accommodate the banks dur-
ing the current emergency" could hamper regulators' efforts to impose stricter require-
ments. To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 492 (statement of Karin Lissakers).
The Senate Banking Committee also mentioned in its report of S. 695 the need to clarify
the existing authority of the banking agencies to establish and enforce appropriate capital
levels for banks under their jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 16. In a recent
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the Comptrol-
ler's capital requirement for a national bank. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of
the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC, and Comptroller of the
Currency, Joint Memorandum: Program of Improved Supervision and Regulation of
International Lending (Apr. 7, 1983), reprinted in Proposed Solutions to International Debt
Problems, supra note 44, at 24 [hereinafter cited as Joint Memorandum].
51. The proposal was resubmitted in the form of draft legislation at the request of the
Senate Banking Committee. S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 11.
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(4) require procedures to account for rescheduling and front-end fees52
over the life of a foreign loan; and
(5) strengthen international cooperation with foreign banking regulators
and through the IMF.
House and Senate bills incorporated the agencies' proposal and an
appropriation for the IMF quota increase.
5 3
B. THE INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION ACT OF 1983
After a year-long struggle to obtain passage of the IMF funding
increase, 54 Congress enacted an eleventh-hour compromise package in
November 1983.55 The package authorized an $8.4 billion increase in
U.S. funding to the IMF and provided for increased regulation of for-
eign loans by commercial banks under the International Lending
Supervision Act.56 The Act requires the banking regulatory agencies
to tighten capital and reserve requirements, increase information col-
lection and disclosure, and modify accounting practices in order to
reduce artificial incentives to engage in foreign lending. It allows the
agencies to exercise discretion, however, in framing regulations and in
fixing requirements for individual banks.
L Capital Adequacy and Evaluation
Several provisions of the Act are designed to ensure adequate cap-
ital levels for banks engaged in international lending. The Act
requires the federal banking agencies to establish minimum capital
levels, which may be raised for individual banks at the discretion of
the appropriate agency. The Act specifies that a failure to meet the
established levels may be deemed an unsafe and unsound practice.
57
52. A front-end fee is a flat fee paid by the borrower to the lending bank on the signing
or disbursement date of a loan. Also called a "commission," "financing fee," or "flat fee,"
it is generally calculated as a percentage of the credit and "in most instances represent[s] an
adjustment to the interest yield" of the loan. Joint Memorandum, supra note 50, at 49, 51.
53. H.R. 2957, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. IV (1983), reprinted in H.R. RP. No. 175,
supra note 25, at 9; S. 695, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
54. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
55. H.R. 3959, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The hybrid legislation included a major
housing appropriations bill, along with reauthorizations for the Export-Import Bank and
other international development banks. Congress broke all procedural rules to pass the
measure, which was incorporated as an amendment to the conference report of a fiscal 1984
supplemental appropriations bill. Id. The Senate approved the amendment on November
17, with minor changes, 129 CONG. REc. S16,538 (Nov. 17, 1983), and the House con-
curred the following day, 129 CONG. REc. H10,529 (Nov. 18, 1983). Supplemental Appro-
priations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (1983).
56. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IX, 97
Stat. 1278 (1983) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912).
57. ILSA, § 908. A finding that a bank is engaged in an "unsafe and unsound prac-
tice" may result in loss of FDIC-insured status. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1982). Until June 1983,
minimum capital requirements were not prescribed for the seventeen "multinational"
banks under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board. Capital-to-asset ratios for the
largest multinational banks had dropped to levels of 4-5% during the 1970s, compared to
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The Act directs the banking agencies to incorporate two factors,
foreign country exposure and transfer risk, into their general examina-
tion procedures and particularly into their evaluations of capital ade-
quacy.5 8 In their joint memorandum to Congress, the banking
agencies had outlined their intention to incorporate these factors more
effectively into examination procedures. The agencies had defined new
loan classification categories to include transfer risk, which will affect
bank asset-quality ratings.5 9 The proposal also had included country
exposure concentrations in bank capital-adequacy evaluations.60
2. Reserves
The Act requires banks to set aside special loan loss reserves for
loans to countries that, in the judgment of the banking agency, are
subject to a high level of transfer risk. Banks are to charge the
reserves against current income and may not consider them part of the
bank's capital or other required loan loss reserves. 61 Charging
reserves against current income gives the reserves the effect of a write-
off. The Act requires the banking agencies to consider certain factors,
such as a borrower's failure to make interest payments or to comply
with IMF adjustment programs, in determining the applicability of the
reserve requirement. 62 Legislators, however, dropped provisions
the minimum level of 6% or more required for banks with less than $1 billion in assets.
Likewise, the FDIC, while maintaining a minimum capital requirement of 5% for banks
under its authority, did not enforce the standard for larger banks. See H.R. RP. No. 175,
supra note 25, at 45. The large banks began increasing capital levels in the second half of
1982, see S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 13, and in June, 1983, the Federal Reserve
issued fixed minimum standards of 5% for multinational banks for the first time, see Mini-
mum Capital Guidelines: Amendments, 69 FED. REs. BULL. 539 (1983). The Act does not
require the establishment of a single, uniform standard for all banks, but the Senate Bank-
ing Committee commented in its report that "the Committee expects the standards devel-
oped under this Act will be uniform among the three bank regulatory agencies, so that
banks with the same characteristics are treated alike regardless of their regulatory status."
S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 16.
58. ILSA, § 904.
59. Joint Memorandum, supra note 50, at app. A, 34-35.
60. Id.
61. ILSA, § 905.
62. Section 905(a)(1) provides:
Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall require a banking institution to
establish and maintain a special reserve whenever, in the judgment of such appro-
priate Federal banking agency-
(A) the quality of such banking institution's assets has been impaired by a pro-
tracted inability of public or private borrowers in a foreign country to make
payments on their external indebtedness as indicated by such factors, among
others, as-
(i) a failure by such public or private borrowers to make full interest pay-
ments on external indebtedness;
(ii) a failure to comply with the terms of any restructured indebtedness; or
(iii) a failure by the foreign country to comply with any International Mone-
tary Fund or other suitable adjustment program; or
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requiring the establishment of reserves for virtually all foreign loans,
and in particular, for all rescheduled loans, from the final version.63
Pursuant to regulations promulgated under the Act, the federal
banking agencies jointly determine which assets they will designate
reservable. 64 In their joint memorandum to Congress, the regulators
defined new loan classification categories, "reservable" and "debt-ser-
vice impaired," to replace the traditional categories of "substandard"
and "doubtful. '65 Reservable loans are those impaired by a protracted
inability of public or private obligors in a foreign country to make
payments, or are those made to borrowers in countries where there are
no definite prospects for the orderly restoration of debt service.66 The
regulations establish an initial guideline for Allocated Transfer Risk
Reserves (ATRRs) in an amount equal to ten percent of each loan
classified as reservable, subject to additional annual increases of fifteen
percent as warranted. 67
3. Information Collection and Disclosure
The Act increases reporting and disclosure requirements for for-
eign country exposure. 68 Banking institutions must report their for-
eign lending exposure to the appropriate banking agency on a
quarterly rather than the former semi-annual basis. The Act also
requires public disclosure of information regarding material foreign
country exposure.69 The reporting requirements will provide a profile
of aggregate country lending data by sector and maturity distribution
and will provide information on U.S. government guaranties.7
0
(B) no definite prospects exist for the orderly restoration of debt service.
63. See S. REP. No. 122, supra note 7, at 14.
64. ATRR Regulations, supra note 31.
65. Joint Memorandum, supra note 50, 1t app. A, 34-35, app. C, 40-44. Loans placed
in the loss category, which remains unchanged, are defined as completely uncollectible (for
example, repudiated debt) and will be written-off. Id. at 35.
66. See ILSA, § 905(a)(1).
67. ATRR Regulations, supra note 31. The regulations also establish a write-off option
for designated assets in lieu of establishing an ATRR. See also S. REP. No. 122, supra note
7, at 14.
68. ILSA, § 907.
69. Revisions to the present Country Exposure Report proposed by the Federal Finan-
cial Institutions Examination Council would define material foreign country exposures as
those exceeding 1.0% of a reporting bank's assets. Less detailed information would be
required on exposures exceeding 0.75% but not exceeding 1.0% of assets. Quarterly
Report of Country Exposure by U.S. Banking Organizations, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,848, 56,849
(1983) (request for comments) [hereinafter cited as Quarterly Report of Country Expo-
sure]. The standard of materiality corresponds to the standard adopted by the SEC in its
new disclosure requirements. SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,627
(1982); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49A, 48 Fed. Reg. 3585 (1983). See supra note
47.
70. Quarterly Report of Country Exposure, supra note 69, at 56,849.
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4. Accounting for Fees
Several provisions of the Act require new accounting treatment
for fees charged in connection with international loans. The Act pro-
hibits a bank from charging loan restructuring fees that exceed the
bank's administrative costs unless the fee is amortized over the life of
the loan. 71 The federal banking agencies must establish regulations for
accounting for front-end fees charged in connection with international
credits over the life of a loan.72 In the past, some banks recognized
front-end fees as current income rather than amortizing the portion
representing interest over the life of the loan. This practice increased
earnings and created an artificial incentive to engage in international
lending.73 The new accounting procedures assure that any portion of
front-end fees that does not represent direct costs will be fully
amortized.74
5. Other Provisions
The remaining provisions of the Act call for international cooper-
ation to coordinate banking regulatory activity with supervisory poli-
cies in other countries,75 and require bank lending officers to submit
economic feasibility evaluations to bank management for certain large
foreign loans.76 The Act gives the GAO audit authority to monitor the
banking agencies' compliance 77 and mandates subsequent reports to
Congress by the banking agencies. 78
III
ANALYSIS
The question remains whether the International Lending Supervi-
sion Act will induce the long-range structural reforms necessary to
solve the problem of excessive country concentrations and overexten-
71. ILSA, § 906(a).
72. Id. § 906(b). See supra note 52.
73. See Accounting for International Loan Fees, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,192, 12,195 (1984) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 20, 211, 351).
74. Id at 12,192-99. The Financial Accounting Standards Board is considering estab-
fishing standards on the subject; generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) do not
now provide for accounting for loan fees. See id. at 12,193.
The banking agencies' proposed rules would have applied equally to loan restructuring
fees and those associated with other international loans. ATRR Regulations, supra note
31, at 5594. The final rules, however, allow banks to charge some syndicated loan fees and
commitment fees on non-restructured international loans when the loans are initiated.
75. ILSA, § 902(2).
76. Id. § 909. Section 909, added by H.R. 2957 but passed with considerably less strin-
gent provisions, requires banks to prepare economic evaluations for foreign loans exceeding
$20 million for mining or metalworking projects. A senior bank official must approve each
evaluation. Federal bank examiners will routinely review the evaluations.
77. Id. at § 911.
78. Id at § 913.
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sion by U.S. banks.79 The regulations are clearly prospective; they are
not designed to alleviate the immediate liquidity crisis. Their effective-
ness should therefore be evaluated in terms of their long-range impact.
The goal of reform should be to establish adequate prior controls on
lending to prevent a recurrence of the crisis. An examination of the
International Lending Supervision Act, however, reveals little substan-
tive regulatory reform and even less of a solution to the international
debt problem.
A. MINIMAL RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN LENDING
Earlier versions of the legislation provided for tougher restric-
tions on foreign lending. 0 Banking regulators and industry analysts
warned, however, against stopping short-term commercial credit flows
to distressed countries. They asserted that these credits might be jeop-
ardized if legislators were to place more stringent controls on banks."'
According to regulators, resolution of the immediate liquidity crisis
calls for more, not less, lending. Consequently, they urged that
reforms should be tempered to minimize short-term effects on private
credit flows. 82
Banking regulators and other analysts also cited problems of
competition in calling for legislative restraint. Differences in supervi-
79. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
80. Chief among these restrictions was the proposal to impose country lending limits
embodied in S. 502 (the Heinz-Proxmire bill), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in
Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 97, and also in H.R.
2957, supra note 53. The banking agencies and some analysts strongly opposed these on
the basis of differences among countries, political pressures, and the fact that banks' expo-
sure in some countries was already high. For the debate on country lending limits, see
International Financial Markets and Related Problems, supra note 18, at 55 (statement of
Paul A. Volcker); To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 224-28 (paper by Jack
Guttentag and Richard Herring); id. at 497-99 (statement by Karin Lissakers); Proposed
Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 83-84; R. DALE & R. MAT-
TIONE, supra note 13, at 34-35.
H.R. 2957, supra note 50, would also have imposed special reserve requirements for all
rescheduled loans. Critics maintained that this kind of requirement might jeopardize
restructuring efforts and result in "regulatory overkill." See W. CLINE, supra note 4, at 99;
Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems, supra note 44, at 91. See generally
GROUP OF THIRTY, RISKS IN INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING, supra note 23, at 213-14.
81. Regulators repeatedly emphasized the need for flexibility in resolving the current
crisis while implementing long-range reforms. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt
Problems, supra note 44, at 16 (statement of Paul A. Volcker). Others question, however,
the desirability of continued commercial short-term balance of payments financing. See
infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
82. "[O]nce high exposures are a fact of life, .. the menu of available remedies is
more limited and some remedies aimed at preventing excessive exposure may be counter-
productive." Guttentag & Herring, supra note 24, at 50. Furthermore, if lines of credit
were cut off or reduced, forcing a reduction in scheduled interest payments, the result could
cause even greater harm to the soundness of the banking system the legislators wanted to
protect. See Maroni, A Strategy to Resolve Mexico's Liquidity Crisis, 228 INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE DISCUSSION PAPERS 11 (1983).
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sory systems in other countries result in competitive disadvantages for
banks. Regulatory differences may encourage banks to locate their
lending activities where capital requirements are less stringent.8 3 In
addition, borrowers may prefer to deal with institutions that are not
subject to public disclosure requirements.8 4 On the other hand, one
commentator argues that "the U.S. should [not] set its standards
according to the lowest common denominator just to protect the com-
petitive position of U.S. banks."' 85 Other commentators endorse the
theory that one country must take the lead in setting stricter regula-
tory requirements, relying on greater international cooperation to
encourage other countries to adopt similar standards.8 6 These com-
mentators recognize that without more stringent requirements, there
will not be an effective solution to the current international debt
problem.
B. CHANGES IN ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
Some of the changes in accounting procedures under the Act
make needed modifications in accounting for foreign lending. Other
provisions, however, will not have enough effect to modify bank lend-
ing behavior. The Act's special reserve requirements for loans to
countries that are experiencing payment difficulties will, in the short-
term, appear to have little effect on bank balance sheets. The criteria
for classifying loans in the reservable category were scaled to an
extremely high level of distress in order not to interfere with current
commercial credit flows, particularly those initiated under IMF aus-
pices. According to industry analysts, the reserve requirements will
only affect loans to a few countries with very minor amounts of debt
outstanding to U.S. banks.87 Most banks have already written off sub-
stantial portions of the loans involved.88
The extent to which the special reserve requirements will effect
desired long-term structural reforms is uncertain. In terms of induc-
83. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 24, at 45-46; Bryant, Eurocurrency Banking:
Alarmist Concerns and Genuine Issues, 2 BROOKINGS DISCUSSION PAPERS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 46 (April 1983). But cf To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at
495 (statement of Karin Lissakers) (protecting competitive position of U.S. bapks should
not control capital adequacy decisions).
84. See Guttentag & Herring, Disclosure Policy and International Banking, 7 BROOK-
INGS DISCUSSION PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 16 (December 1983).
85. To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 495 (statement of Karin Lissakers).
86. See, eg., International Bank Lending, supra note 38, at 338-39 (statement of J.
Charles Partee, Bd. of Gov., Fed. Res. Sys.).
87. Sources indicated that new reserves would be required for loans to Zaire (equal to
75% of principal outstanding); Sudan (50%); Poland and Nicaragua (15%); and Bolivia
(10%). The amount of reserves required is less than 6% of the nine largest U.S. banks'




ing banks to increase capital levels, one study concluded that there
would be little incentive because banks' true capital would remain
unaffected by the new write-off.8 9 Regulators would be able to force
banks to increase capital levels only when the required reserves
brought capital levels below the statutory minimum.90 It is possible
that at some point the reserve requirements might be applied to a
larger debtor country whose situation had deteriorated. Requiring
U.S. banks to set aside reserves equal to ten percent of loans to Mexico
or Brazil,91 for example, would have a more extreme impact on bank
capital.
92
On the other hand, some regulators have warned that the reserve
requirements may not go far enough to protect adequately against loan
losses.93 The SEC has warned bank holding companies that the
amount allocated to meet transfer risk reserve requirements may not
be enough to meet the requirements of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) for prudent loan loss reserves.94 At a minimum,
however, the reserves should have some cushioning effect for large
losses in the event the problem loans are not repaid.
The new requirements for accounting for loan fees will provide
uniform accounting procedures and require the amortization of any
portion of the fee that is not a reimbursement of direct costs. These
reforms are consistent with good accounting practice. The new
accounting methods will cause only a short-term reduction in bank
earnings, until the changeover is complete. 95 The amortization
requirement, however, may eliminate any artificial incentive to boost
earnings by engaging in foreign loans with high front-end fees
attached. In this respect, the Act encourages banks to exercise
restraint in exposing themselves to country risk.96
89. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See also Guttentag & Herring, The Cur-
rent Crisis in International Banking, 8 BROOKINGS DISCUSSION PAPERS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 30-31 (Dec. 1983).
90. Guttentag & Herring, Current Crisis in International Banking, supra note 89.
91. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
92. See Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
93. SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 56, Disclosure Concerning Mandated
Reserves, 49 Fed. Reg. 4936 (1984) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 211).
94. II.
95. The new accounting requirements will not affect earnings over the long-term. For
example,
suppose a bank extended $1 billion in four-year loans every year, charging one
percent in fees. The traditional method of including all fees as current income
would allow the bank to declare $10 million in underwriting earnings every year,
beginning in the first year. Averaging would require the bank to report $2.5 mil-
lion, $5 million, and $7.5 million in... earnings in years one, two, and three, and
$10 million in every succeeding year. Thus the choice of method has a short-term
effect on reported earnings but no long-term effect.
R. DALE & R. MATTIONE, supra note 13, at 39 n.69.
96. See Joint Memorandum, supra note 50, at 30.
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C. NEW DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The Act's new disclosure provisions may prove to be the center-
piece, of the reforms. The provisions make information on country
exposure concentrations publicly available, thereby enabling market
discipline to play a greater role in regulating bank exposures. The dis-
closure requirements parallel those the SEC recently adopted.97 Con-
sequently, the disclosures should not disrupt the market to any
significant extent in the short term.
The question for the long term is whether markets will respond to
routine disclosure so as to control overexposure before a crisis occurs.
Some analysts doubt the ability of the market to respond soon enough
or strongly enough to constrain lending.98 In addition, governmental
rescues of troubled banks further weaken the market's influence on
lending practice.99 On the other hand, some analysts argue that rou-
tine prior disclosure of lending data is less likely to be disruptive than
sudden disclosure under crisis conditions and that subsequent disclo-
sure is certain once a crisis develops. 1°°
As a complement to regulatory controls, market controls could
reinforce regulators' efforts to contain country risk exposure. Regula-
tory controls alone have clearly proved ineffective. At the very least,
more frequent reporting of lending data will make these controls more
efficient. Nevertheless, the long-term effect of public disclosure on
country lending concentrations remains unclear.
D. SHORT-TERM LENIENCY VERSUS LONG-TERM REFORM
The International Lending Supervision Act strikes a balance
between long-term structural reform and short-term leniency to avoid
disrupting private credit flows and exacerbating the current liquidity
crisis. If anything, the reforms err on the side of leniency for the lend-
ing banks. As the pressure on the debtor nations grows, however, the
wisdom of congressional leniency becomes increasingly suspect.10 So
far, the rescheduling packages have provided little true debt relief.
The losses from bad loans have been shifted to the debtor countries,
97. See supra note 69.
98. To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 208-09 (paper by Jack Guttentag &
Richard Herring).
99. The highly-publicized rescue of the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company
casts further doubt on the prospects for greater market controls on bank lending. See 42
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 847 (May 21, 1984).
100. For a full analysis of disclosure policy, see Guttentag & Herring, Disclosure Policy
and International Banking, supra note 84.
101. See Riding, The New Crisis for Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1984, at IF, 8F.
See also Samuelson, Do Banks Serve U.S. Interests?, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1984, at FI, F8.
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while banks have managed to protect their profits. 10 2 Increasingly,
U.S. commentators and representatives from the debtor countries
question the wisdom and effectiveness of current lending policies.
Without a restoration of economic growth, the debt-servicing capacity
of Latin American and other developing countries cannot improve,
and without a reduction in debt burdens, the prospects for economic
recovery are bleak.' 0 3 A reduction in interest charges and fees on cur-
rent lending along with an extension of the maturity of outstanding
loans will be necessary in order to end the cycle of economic stagna-
tion in the debtor countries.
1°4
Over the long term, the ILSA is only an initial step toward con-
trolling bank exposures to developing countries. On the positive side,
the reforms recognize that basic structural problems exist and attempt
to address them apart from the immediate liquidity crisis. The regula-
tions encourage the reduction of country concentrations of bank loan
exposures and provide some additional cushioning for the effect on
bank balance sheets in the event the condition of the debtor countries
does not improve. They also increase the availability of information
regarding the financial condition of country borrowers. The impact of
each of these changes, however, is yet to be felt. The legislation does
not address a number of other significant issues which must play a role
in any long-range solution to the debt problem. Among the most
urgent are the need to reduce the debt burden of the debtor countries
and to diminish the reliance on short-term commercial credit for cur-
rent account financing.'05
102. See Samuelson, supra note 101. Each time loans are rolled-over, spreads and
banks' profits are increased. Instead of adding to capital investment, current lending to
Latin American countries is quickly recycled to cover interest payments on outstanding
loans. Of the $5.0 billion in new loans to Mexico in 1983, for example, $3.5 billion went to
cover the interest and fees on the new loan and the $20 billion in rescheduled loans. The
remaining $1.5 billion went toward interest payments on rescheduled debt. To Increase the
U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 490 (statement of Karin Lissakers).
103. Ronald Leven and David Roberts note that high interest rates and low industrial
country growth will prolong the recovery period. See Latin America's Prospects for Recov-
ery, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.Q. REv., Autumn 1983, at 6. For a similar conclusion, see the
analysis of prospects for Latin American recovery under alternative assumptions of interest
rates and industrial country growth in T. ENDERS & R. MATrIoNE, LATIN AMERICA:
THE CRISIS OF DEBT AND GROWTH (1984).
104. See Samuelson, supra note 101; Silk, Ending Latin Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 2,
1984, at D2, col. 1; T. ENDERS & R. MATIONE, supra note 103.
105. Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring, in their study of international lending expo-
sure, list these and other criteria for evaluating policy actions to deal with the debt crisis.
See To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 195-96. Analysts have proposed a
number of methods to stretch out the distressed countries' debt repayment schedules and to
convert short-term credit to longer-term debt instruments. See generally, R. DALE & R.
MATrIONE, supra note 13, for a discussion of several prominent proposals. See also
Anthony M. Solomon, Toward a More Resilient International Financial System, FED. REs.
BANK N.Y.Q. REv., Autumn 1983, at 1 (listing a number of nongovernmental initiatives
for alleviating the debt crisis).
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. An escalation of the liquidity and solvency problems of the debtor
countries could increase significantly the impact of the new regulations
onbanks. 10 6 Growing resistance to the austerity programs and to
high interest rates that were negotiated in the first round of restructur-
ing threatens to erupt in a new crisis which may trigger a new series of
adjustments within the financial system. 107
In the long run, tougher policies will undoubtedly be necessary to
reduce bank exposure to developing countries. The degree to which
these policies will require stronger regulatory measures will depend on
the success of other efforts to address the problem. The extent of
international cooperation achieved among banking supervisory sys-
tems will proportionately affect the success of U.S. controls. 10 8 Other
proposals call for a greater role for the IMF in lending supervision' 0 9
as well as for increased information sharing with banks 110 and greater
public disclosure."' Another factor that will determine the need for
regulatory measures is the efficacy of market controls, which in part
depends upon the amount of information available to investors and
depositors. In addition, the success of independent prudential efforts
adopted by banks themselves will determine the extent of needed regu-
latory controls.112
106. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
107. See Riding, The New Crisis for Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1984, at IF, col.
2, 8F, col. 1.
108. See Chan, An International Code for Banking Supervision, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July
1983, at 26-27 (on the report of the Cooke Committee to the Bank for International Settle-
ments); Joint Memorandum, supra note 50, at 31.
109. See R. DALE & R. MATrIONE, supra note 13, at 33-34. These proposals call for
continuous IMF involvement in monitoring developing-country borrowing strategies before
problems emerge. Currently, the Fund intercedes only when the borrower experiences dif-
ficulties and applies for IMF assistance. Some proponents suggest that it would be possible
to expand the Fund's surveillance responsibilities under the exchange-rate supervision
authority granted in the IMF Articles of Agreement, given the impact of external debt on
forming exchange-rate policies. Id. at 33 n.56.
110. Id. at 32-33. Some analysts express concern that greater information sharing might
discourage disclosure by member countries to the IMF. Id.; M. MENDELSOHN, supra note
16, at 13.
111. The IMF is starting to disclose more complete data on international lending. In
January 1984, the Fund added six new tables to its monthly publication, International
Financial Statistics. The tables provide for the first time disaggregated data on interna-
tional credit flows and deposits by country of borrower and lender. 42 WASH. FIN. REP.
(BNA) No. 3, at 154 (Jan. 16, 1984). The IMF quota increase passed by Congress included
a provision calling for more complete and timely exchange of financial data with members
of the banking system as well as greater public information disclosure. Pub. L. No. 98-181,
§ 802 97 Stat. 1268 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-2).
112. In the second half of 1982, banks began increasing loan-loss reserves. To Increase
the US. Quota, supra note 20, at 494 (statement of Karin Lissakers). The capital-to-loan
ratios of the 17 largest banks rose from 4.39% at the end of 1980 to 5.02% at the end of
1982. Id. at 249 n.5 (statement of William R. Cline, Inst. for Int'l Economics).
As an alternative to greater governmental disclosure requirements, 36 banks from nine
countries formed the Institute of International Finance (11F) in early 1983. The institute
intends to promote the exchange of economic and financial information between banks and
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"[R]eplacing the banks as the principal vehicle for capital flows to
developing countries will be the principal international financial chal-
lenge of the 1980's."' 13 The International Lending SupervisionAct's
contribution to reducing the overextension of U.S. banks will only be
apparent several years hence. The Act takes an initial step toward
controlling foreign lending in the longer term, while avoiding any
measurable impact on current lending practice.
IV
CONCLUSION
The global debt crisis that emerged in 1982-83 forced a legislative
reappraisal of bank lending and banking regulation. Regulatory con-
trols 'had proved inadequate to prevent the dangerous overexposure of
U.S. banks to developing country borrowers. The International Lend-
ing Supervision Act imposes new controls on foreign lending designed
to prevent a recurrence of the debt buildup. The existing large coun-
try debt concentrations, however, limited the available remedies. Leg-
islators were forced to balance long-term structural reform with the
need to preserve short-term commercial credit flows to distressed
countries.
The International Lending Supervision Act takes an initial step
toward controlling foreign lending exposure. While stronger measures
undoubtedly will be necessary in the long run to effect a permanent
resolution of the problem, the Act avoids the disruptive effect that
more stringent controls might have had on the immediate payments
crisis. At the same time, the reforms encourage the reduction of coun-
try concentrations of bank loan exposures and introduce greater mar-
ket controls through more- complete foreign lending disclosure.
Comprehensive solutions to the global debt problem, however, will
require more fundamental reforms.
Ellen W. Smith
borrowing countries. See Global Economic Outlook Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1983) (statement of William S. Ogden, interim chmn., IIF). Many bankers
remain skeptical about the usefulness of the IlF. See M. MENDELSOHN, supra note 16, at
18, 34-36.
113. To Increase the U.S. Quota, supra note 20, at 252 (statement of William R. Cline).
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